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Saudi Arabia
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(30)

[redacted]

Date: May 19, 1953
Time: 10:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(E)

SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

PLACE: Riyadh

PARTICIPANTS:

United States	Saudi Arabia
The Secretary	Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister
Mr. Stassen	Sheikh Yussef, Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hare	Khalid Bey
Mr. Byroade	
Mr. MacArthur	
Interpreter	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY VWOLFJR DATE 6/1/82
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

SUMMARY

Mr. Dulles opened the conversation by stating that although this was a short trip, it had been a very fruitful and useful one. He had been able, after talking with His Majesty and Crown Prince Saud, to formulate some ideas about the problem the Saudis had on their hands. Mr. Dulles added that the U.S. had been of help in the past, and he hoped she would be of great help in the future.

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

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Mr. Dulles said that for sometime the U.S. had used its good offices with Britain in order to reach an amicable and honorable solution; and he believed that after this visit, during which he had collected a lot of information, the U.S. could do more.

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

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Mr. Dulles said he believed that Saudi Arabia, in accepting the principle of arbitration, was following an important and helpful approach.



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

Mr. Stassen stated that the U.S. was in the process of preparing the 1954 aid program for presentation to Congress, and he added that he believed President Eisenhower had told Prince Faisal that he had found Saudi Arabia eligible for grant aid, and that part of the present trip was to study the whole situation in connection with granting military aid to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Stassen said that when such information had been placed in the hands of President Eisenhower, action would be taken in the light of further reports which would be received from Ambassador Hare in connection with military equipment sent to Saudi Arabia. The whole subject, Mr. Stassen continued, would be studied from every angle and would then be presented to President Eisenhower. He said he believed that the recommendations which would be submitted in connection with the military aid program under the Mutual Security Act would parallel the policy of the Secretary of State. When a decision had been reached, it would be submitted to His Majesty's government. Mr. Stassen added that he believed that after this step had been taken by the group on this visit, the discussion of this subject would be satisfactory and it would be reported either through the American Ambassador in Jidda or the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington.



Mr. Dulles said there were two points in approaching the question of military aid: (1) The general view which is based on aid for the whole area and which requires an understanding among the states of the Middle East

area

area of their responsibility in its defense. (2) The approach to each country separately. Under this approach Saudi Arabia had been one of the countries found eligible for such aid. Saudi Arabia would be included in the general aid or the separate aid. Mr. Dulles desired the Saudi Arabian Government to understand that the American Department of Defense was anxious that this military equipment would be used in the best possible way, due to the fact that there were great and unlimited demands for military equipment at the present time. It was very difficult to estimate the demands which were submitted to the U.S. for military equipment. In addition to this fact, there was an actual war in Korea which was consuming great quantities of military equipment and ammunition, either for the American forces, the Southern Korean forces, or the UN forces.

If the war were stopped, this would reduce the demands for military equipment, but events did not prove that the war was going to be stopped. If the truce negotiations failed, the U.S. might have to double her military efforts, and as a result there would be an increased demand for military equipment. There was also the forces in Formosa. The new administration had learned that the people in Formosa had been promised certain military equipment by President Truman but that only 30 per cent had been recognized. There was also the war in Indo China which required military equipment. When the last invasion was carried on in Laos, the U.S. sent more equipment to the people fighting there. At the same time, the U.S. was responding to demands for more military equipment from the members of the Atlantic Pact, such as Norway which was threatened by Communism. There was also a demand for military equipment from Turkey and her allies. In giving these explanations to the Saudi Arabian Government, Mr. Dulles said, it did not mean that the U.S. would not be able to help Saudi Arabia, but it meant merely that the U.S. had certain pressures for military equipment. The military experts had the last word as to which area should be offered preference for military equipment.

Mr. Dulles said it was evident that there was a desire for collective defense in this area and that supplying military equipment for collective defense in this area was easier than supplying each country separately. He also believed, he said, that the program for the Middle East defense as it had been submitted did not mean that it must be accepted in the way it was presented. The whole aim of the project was to defend the area. It was up to the states of the area to come to an understanding on the way of defending the Middle East. In fact, the United States was motivated by the desire to unite the different, small states in order that they could defend themselves collectively. The Communist threat which we were facing now was also a result of a unity of different states like Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.; but the difference was that these states were united by force. Nevertheless, they formed one-third of the whole population of the world. Such unity had to be faced, but the U.S. did not like to form her unity in the way the Communists had formed theirs. The U.S. would prefer that such unity be formed by means of understanding and satisfaction.

Of course,

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Of course, this did not mean that the U.S. would request the free states to form a collective security solely to face the Communist threat. Such cooperation included all mutual matters to defend the country. And as far as the integrity of these countries was concerned, Mr. Dulles said, it must be maintained. America therefore hoped that such collective cooperation for defending the area would be increased, and America did not state, as a condition for offering arms to these countries, that they must accept the idea of a defense project. However, any collective cooperation among these states would help in complying with the demands for military equipment.



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Mr. Dulles said there was a point which he would like to refer to as evidence of cooperation. This point was the useful cooperation between the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. It might be that there were certain impressions given during the recent political campaign that the United States was not pleased with the relationship existing between Aramco and Saudi Arabia, but this was merely a domestic question which had to do with the political campaign. The U.S. was in fact very pleased and happy over the friendly relations and cooperation existing between Aramco and Saudi Arabia, and was also appreciative of the facilities offered at Dhahran Air Field. As a result of these points, the U.S. felt that the Government of Saudi Arabia was actually participating in mutual security activities, and Saudi Arabia's cooperation in this field was appreciated.

If the U.S. gave any preference to any state by means of grant aid, Mr. Dulles said, it did not mean that she was basing her claim on regional worthiness but on the strategic requirements of that country. The U.S. always took into consideration the situation of that country and the circumstances in existence. In fact, there was only one division now in America while there were six in Germany and two in Japan. Mr. Dulles said he believed that defense of the United States must be made outside the United States, and this was why we were distributing U.S. forces. It was his desire, he said, that the King and His Highness understand that military aid was only offered on the basis of the military recommendation and not on the regional basis. If it were to be granted on the regional situation, the U.S. would have brought all her forces into the United States. The U.S. was also preparing defense of the United States alone, but she was preparing for the United States' friends too. Mr. Dulles reiterated that His Highness must not get the idea that the U.S. was not ready to give military aid to Saudi Arabia.

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

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Mr. Stassen stated that he was personally interested in the military equipment sent by the United States to Saudi Arabia. He added that if there were anything wrong with it, a report should be made to the United States Government through the American Ambassador.